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Explaining White Opposition to Black Political Leadership:  
The Role of Fear of Racial Favoritism 
 
Despite the election of America’s first black president, most non-Hispanic whites continue to 
oppose black political leadership.  The conventional explanation for white opposition is sheer 
racial prejudice, yet the available empirical evidence for this theory is inconsistent.  I test an 
alternative theory that whites perceive black political leaders as a threat to their group’s interests.  
Using a new survey measure and nationally representative panel data covering the 2008, 2010, 
and 2012 U.S. elections, I find that a majority of whites perceive black elected officials as likely 
to favor blacks over whites.  Moreover, fear of racial favoritism predicts support for Barack 
Obama in both cross-sectional models and fixed effects models of within-person change, 
controlling for negative racial stereotypes.  I replicate these findings using a separate cross-
sectional survey fielded after the 2014 election that controls for racial resentment.  Collectively, 
these results suggest that perceptions of conflicting group interests—and not just prejudice—
drive white opposition to black political leadership. 
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 Despite the re-election of America’s first black president, many white Americans 
continue to withhold their support from black candidates.  Indeed, both in 2008 and 2012 a 
majority of non-Hispanic whites did not vote for President Obama (Ansolabehere & Stewart, 
2009; Cillizza & Cohen, 2012).  The primary explanation, according to the conventional 
wisdom, is racial prejudice—that is, whites’ negative attitudes toward blacks as a group.  And 
indeed, whites with greater racial prejudice were less likely to support Obama (e.g., Hutchings, 
2009; Pasek et al., 2009; Pasek et al., 2014; Piston, 2010; Tesler, 2013).  Yet in prior studies of 
biracial elections the evidence that prejudice reduced support for black candidates is mixed 
(Citrin et al., 1990; Knuckley & Orey, 2000; Sears et al., 1997).  Experimental studies randomly 
varying the race of fictional candidates have also failed to conclusively answer this question 
(Hutchings & Valentino, 2004; Reeves, 1997; Sigelman et al., 1995; Terkildsen, 1993).  Given 
these inconsistent findings, it remains unclear why many whites oppose black candidates. 
An alternative explanation based on group conflict theory suggests that whites may 
oppose black candidates because they are perceived as a threat to their group’s interests (e.g., 
Levine & Campbell, 1972; Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006).  Social psychologists and 
sociologists have long distinguished between prejudice and group conflict (for a review, see 
Esses et al., 2010), but public opinion scholars have rarely tested these theories head-to-head.  
This is especially true in the case of biracial elections, despite the many anecdotal accounts of 
whites expressing fears of racial favoritism (e.g., Broh, 1987; Gillespie, 2010; Hajnal, 2001).  
During the 2008 campaign, for instance, one white woman at an Ohio rally for John McCain 
said, “I’m afraid if he wins, the blacks will take over” (Schwartz, 2008).  Another white voter, a 
union organizer from Pittsburgh, said he would not vote for Obama because “white people look 
out for white people, and black people look out for black people” (Merida, 2008).  Anecdotes 
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notwithstanding, systematic evidence has been lacking due to the absence of a survey measure of 
this key concept (for an exception, see Baek & Landau, 2011).   
 Thus, in this study I propose a new measure of white fear of racial favoritism that 
assesses the extent to which whites perceive black elected officials as likely to favor blacks over 
whites and include it on a nationally representative panel survey covering the 2008, 2010, and 
2012 U.S. elections.  I show, for the first time, that a majority of white Americans expects black 
elected officials to favor blacks over whites.  Moreover, white fear of racial favoritism is 
consequential.  In all cross-sectional models fear of racial favoritism had large negative effects 
on support for Obama, controlling for derogatory racial stereotypes.  Additionally, fixed effects 
models of within-person change show that fear of racial favoritism – but not racial stereotypes – 
predicted declines over time in support for Obama from 2008 to 2012 at the individual level.  A 
separate survey fielded after the 2014 election further demonstrates that the cross-sectional 
results hold controlling for racial resentment.  Collectively, these many findings strongly suggest 
that fear of racial favoritism – and not just racial prejudice – undercuts white support for black 
candidates.  
 
Group Conflict in Biracial Elections  
Prejudice and realistic group conflict are two of the dominant theories employed to 
explain intergroup discrimination.  In an early definition, Allport described prejudice as “an 
antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (1954: 9) – that is, as a negative 
attitude toward an “out-group” that is based on false information and resists change.  In recent 
years, most scholars now define prejudice more expansively, including cases where, even 
lacking hostility, people nonetheless view their own “in-group” as having more desirable traits 
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than the out-group (i.e., ingroup favoritism) (e.g., Brown & Zagefka, 2005; Brewer, 1999).  This 
definition has the benefit of encapsulating the many current approaches to studying prejudice – 
from stereotypes to emotional responses, old-fashioned to modern expressions of bias, and 
explicit to implicit attitudes (see Dovidio et al., 2010 for a review).  All of these approaches 
predict that individuals with more positive attitudes toward their own in-group than the out-
group are likely to engage in discrimination against the out-group.   
Group conflict theory offers a different perspective by highlighting the role of intergroup 
competition.  Initially known as realistic group conflict theory, this approach suggests that “the 
inherently competitive elements in [a] situation can be set off from the accompanying prejudice” 
(Allport, 1954: 230-31).  Rather than simple dislike or unfavorable stereotypes, discrimination 
may result from “a genuine clash of interests” (Allport, 1954: 233).  Importantly, this clash can 
occur due to the perception of either material or symbolic threats.  Conflicts over scarce material 
and economic resources produce intergroup bias (e.g., Sherif et al., 1961), but so do symbolic 
threats, such as those stemming from conflicting value systems (Allport, 1954).  And contrary to 
characterizations of this theory as focused only on objective threats, even early proponents 
emphasized individuals’ perceptions of competing group interests as the driving force of group 
conflict (e.g., Allport, 1954; Levine & Campbell, 1972).  As a recent review concluded, 
“research in this area has shifted from a focus on trying to understand true conflicts of interest 
between groups to an acknowledgment that perceptions of conflicts of interest are of utmost 
importance” (Essess et al., 2010: 225, original emphasis).   
A related vein of scholarship in sociology has focused on the impact of group conflict on 
racial attitudes.  Drawing on Blumer’s (1958: 4) account of bias as steeped in “a positional 
arrangement of racial groups,” group position theory emphasizes “an intrinsically collective or 
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group-based dimension to issues of racial politics” (Bobo & Tuan, 2006: 31).  Whites who 
believe “that blacks are a threat to real resources and accepted practices” (Bobo, 1983: 1197) 
respond by opposing public policies that would benefit them (Bobo, 1999).  In other words, this 
theory suggests that whites who see racial politics as a zero-sum game for material or symbolic 
resources are more likely to oppose policies that would benefit blacks.  Conceptualized in this 
way, perceptions of racial group threat have been shown to reduce support for race-related public 
policies even after controlling for the impact of traditional measures of racial prejudice (e.g., 
Bobo, 1983, 1988, 1999, 2000; Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Kinder & Sanders, 1996).   
Nevertheless, scholars have rarely applied theories of group conflict to biracial election 
contests; yet to the extent that whites see race relations as a zero-sum game, they should perceive 
black candidates as particularly threatening to their group interests (Bobo & Tuan, 2006).  Hajnal 
(2007: 3) further suggests that “many whites fear that a black leader will favor the black 
community over the white community” especially lacking much, if any, prior experience with 
black political leadership.  One potential consequence is white uncertainty and fear about what 
black representation will mean for white interests: “heightened uncertainty in black challenger 
elections leads most whites to believe they are facing an anti-white candidate and to vote to 
prevent a black takeover" (Hajnal, 2007: 17).   
 Despite having a clear theoretical basis, systematic evidence of widespread fear of racial 
favoritism is extremely limited.  For example, several studies of white voting behavior in biracial 
mayoral elections used only indirect measures.  One study found less support for black 
candidates in cities with larger black populations and where black candidates explicitly targeted 
black voters (Hajnal, 2007).  Another study used measures of perceptions of race relations 
(Kaufmann, 1998), and a third study operationalized this concept narrowly with items measuring 
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material threats to whites’ self-interests (Kinder & Sears, 1981).  Two additional studies, on the 
other hand, measured beliefs about racial favoritism by Obama specifically, and thus confounded 
fear of racial favoritism and dislike of Obama (Lewis-Beck, Tien, & Nadeau, 2010; Tien, 
Nadeau, & Lewis-Beck, 2012).
1
  Finally, one prior study employs my new measures of fear of 
racial favoritism to explain cross-party voting in a single cross-sectional analysis from the 2008 
election (Baek & Landau, 2011), though without controlling for racial prejudice.  This study, on 
the other hand, tests the impact of fear of racial favoritism against two different measures of 
racial prejudice, encompasses four election cycles, and assesses not only cross-sectional 
associations but also within-person change over time.    
 
Fear of Racial Favoritism and Racial Prejudice 
 To underscore the theoretical distinctiveness of fear of racial favoritism, consider three of 
the most widely employed conceptualizations of racial prejudice: old-fashioned racism, 
derogatory racial stereotypes, and racial resentment (Huddy & Feldman, 2009).  As indicators of 
racial prejudice, each of these approaches posits that whites view blacks as inferior to whites, 
though the motivation and expression of these attitudes vary considerably.  Old-fashioned 
racism, for instance, involves beliefs that blacks are not only inferior to whites, but inherently so 
(Virtanen & Huddy, 1998).  While such views have certainly declined over time, they have not 
disappeared (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Tesler, 2013).  In fact, in one recent 
survey about 4-in-10 whites attributed blacks’ lower levels of educational or economic 
achievement at least in part to genetic differences between whites and blacks (Huddy & 
Feldman, 2009).  The belief that blacks lack the same innate ability as whites epitomizes blatant 
                                                 
1
 For example, one question asked whites “which of the following groups in society do you think will be 
favored if Barack Obama is elected president?” (Lewis-Beck, Tien, & Nadeau, 2010).  
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racial prejudice, thus it provides the starkest contrast with fear of racial favoritism, which 
involves neither beliefs about racial inferiority nor a biological basis for group differences.  
Instead, fear of racial favoritism is about perceptions of competing group interests, in particular 
that blacks will use electoral victories to advance the interests of blacks at the expense of whites.   
 Unlike old-fashioned racism, agreement with racial stereotypes does not necessarily 
involve believing that blacks are inherently inferior to whites (e.g., Bobo & Kleugel, 1993; 
Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Levine, Carmines, & Sniderman, 1999; Piston, 2010; Virtanen & 
Huddy, 1998).  Here racial inferiority is expressed through whites’ more positive assessments of 
the traits of whites than blacks—that is, through in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1999).  The key 
difference between this approach and old-fashioned racism is that whites may concur that blacks 
are less hardworking, trustworthy, honest, law-abiding, and intelligent without attributing these 
differences to biological origins.  The expression of racial inferiority is also indirect: “stereotype 
questions are formatted so that people can express favoritism for their own group without 
flagrantly violating norms of fairness.  Thus, for example, white Americans who believe that 
blacks are less intelligent than whites can do so indirectly, in a sequence of separated judgments, 
without ever having to subscribe to the invidious comparison” (Kinder & Kam, 2009: 46-47).   
  Measures of racial resentment – known variously as “symbolic,” “modern,” and “new” 
racism – place a similar emphasis on indirect measurement of anti-black attitudes and the 
stereotype of blacks as lazy.  But according to this framework, prejudice is now “expressed in the 
language of individualism” (Kinder & Sanders, 1996: 106), as whites view blacks as overly 
demanding and simultaneously undeserving of special government support (Sears & Henry, 
2003.  The twin supports of this viewpoint are a denial of ongoing racial discrimination and the 
perception that blacks’ lower socioeconomic status is due primarily to a failure of willpower and 
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hard work.  Racial resentment thus overlaps considerably with racial stereotypes (Virtanen & 
Huddy, 1998).  At the same time, racial resentment has been hypothesized to include a strong 
emotional component as well, and thus overall encapsulates “a blend of anti-black affect and the 
kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant ethic” (Kinder & Sears, 
1981: 416).   
 To what extent is fear of racial favoritism theoretically distinctive from racial stereotypes 
and racial resentment?  On the one hand, fear of racial favoritism is not, on its face, concerned 
with the stereotypical character traits ascribed to blacks in general nor to black elected officials 
in particular (for an approach that does the latter, see Schneider & Bos, 2011).  Racial 
resentment, for its part, has been described as a “subtle prejudice” and strongly contrasted with 
perceptions of competing group interests as predictors of opposition to a variety of race-related 
policy attitudes (Kinder & Sanders, 1996: 93).  On the other hand, fear of racial favoritism may 
be linked in the minds of some whites to the belief that blacks demand government support that 
they do not deserve.  It is certainly plausible that fear of racial favoritism, racial stereotypes, and 
racial resentment are all part of the same constellation of beliefs, though even if this were the 
case it would still be important to measure and assess the unique impact of fear of racial 
favoritism.  Whites may, of course, perceive that black elected officials favor blacks over whites 
without holding negative attitudes about blacks more broadly, whether in the form of derogatory 
stereotypes or racial resentment.  Ultimately these are important empirical questions – ones that 
have not been directly tested before – so to resolve them we must turn to real-world data on 
white support for black political leadership.  For this purpose, I carry out a variety of analyses of 
white support for America’s first black president, Barack Obama.   
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Methods 
To examine whether fear of racial favoritism is not only conceptually, but also 
empirically, distinctive in its effects on white public opinion, this study employs an eight-wave 
nationally representative panel survey that began in fall 2007 and ended in winter 2013.  The 
first five waves were collected as part of the 2008 National Annenberg Election Study (NAES), 
fielded between fall 2007 and winter 2009.  Wave 1 began with approximately 20,000 
respondents, with fresh samples added to each subsequent wave.  For wave 6, fielded in 2010, I 
reinterviewed a random sub-set of 3,263 non-Hispanic whites from the 2008 NAES.
2
  Finally, 
for waves 7 and 8, fielded immediately before and after the 2012 election, I recontacted a 
representative sub-sample of 2,606 respondents from the 2008 NAES.
3
  All waves were fielded 
over the Internet by GfK (formerly Knowledge Networks), which recruits nationally 
representative samples of adults using address-based sampling, and supplies free Internet access 
to those who need it.  The dates of each wave are: wave 1: Oct. 2, 2007—Jan. 1, 2008; wave 2: 
Jan. 1—March 31, 2008; wave 3: April 2—Aug. 29, 2008; wave 4: Aug. 29—Nov. 4, 2008; 
wave 5: Nov. 5, 2008—Jan. 31, 2009; wave 6: Sept. 21, 2010—Oct. 6, 2010; wave 7: Oct. 20—
Oct. 29, 2012; and wave 8: Nov. 14, 2012—Jan. 29, 2013.  
These panel data provide an unprecedented opportunity to examine the impact of racial 
considerations over time, though as with all panels there are concerns about attrition and 
conditioning. Fortunately, further investigation revealed that neither issue posed a serious 
problem for this study.  Although some attrition occurred, the 2008, 2010, and 2012 samples are 
broadly representative of the American adult population.
4
  Additional analyses also revealed no 
                                                 
2
 The 2010 wave was funded by [source name blinded].  
3
 Waves 7 and 8 were fielded as part of the [survey name blinded].  
4
 Consistent with prior studies of GfK samples (Chang & Krosnick, 2009), Table B1 in Appendix B 
shows that the panel compares favorably with census data, though as with national surveys more 
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evidence of conditioning: answering the racial attitude measures on one wave had no effect on 
responses to the same measures on future waves.
5
 
To measure fear of racial favoritism, I designed four survey items to assess whites’ 
perceptions of the frequency of favoritism and one item to assess their attitudes about favoritism.  
On waves 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, respondents were asked whether black elected officials are more 
likely to favor blacks over whites in various aspects of government activities.  Starting in wave 3, 
a single item then asked whether such favoritism was good or bad.  As shown in Table 1, which 
includes the full wording and response frequencies of the items on wave 8, a majority of whites 
perceived racial favoritism on three of the four items: 54 percent concurred that black elected 
officials are more likely to give special favors to the black community; 55 percent believed that 
they favor blacks for government jobs; and fully 61 percent believed that they support 
government spending that favors blacks.  Even 36 percent believed that they could cost whites 
jobs.  Unsurprisingly, most whites—81 percent—evaluated racial favoritism negatively.   
[Table 1 about Here] 
To produce a measure of Perceptions of Racial Favoritism, I averaged the four 
perception items into a reliable scale; the cronbach’s alphas are .94 (wave 3), .92 (wave 5), .93 
(wave 6), .94 (wave 7), and .94 (wave 8).  Consistent with the items capturing a single concept, a 
principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation showed that in all waves these items 
load onto a single factor.  The measure is coded to range from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates 
                                                                                                                                                             
generally younger and lower-educated individuals were somewhat underrepresented.  For the 2012 
sample, lower-educated and minority respondents from the 2008 NAES were targeted for recruitment.  
Using panel weights to correct for demographic representativeness does not change the results.     
5
 OLS regression analyses revealed that the number of prior waves in which respondents received the 
favoritism items had no effect on responses to these items on wave 8, controlling for demographic and 
political variables (Coeff . = .01, p = .31, N = 1,613).  The number of prior waves in which respondents 
received the stereotype items also had no effect on responses to these items on wave 8 (Coeff. = -.003, p = 
.24, N = 1,677).   
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perceiving little favoritism and one a great deal of favoritism.  Attitudes about Racial Favoritism 
is a single-item measure, also coded to range from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates a very positive 
evaluation of favoritism and one a very negative evaluation.  The pearson’s correlations between 
these measures are close to zero in all waves.
6
  Although Baek and Landau (2011) combined 
these measures into a single index, I instead test this assumption by modeling the interaction.   
To measure racial prejudice, I rely on a standard indicator used on the General Social 
Surveys and American National Election Studies since 1990 and 1992, respectively.  Starting in 
the latter part of wave 3, a battery of items indirectly assessed the extent to which whites have 
more positive attitudes toward whites than blacks.  In a series of six questions posed at different 
points in the surveys—with the order randomized and separated by nonracial items—whites 
rated both whites and blacks on scales ranging from hardworking to lazy, intelligent to 
unintelligent, and trustworthy to untrustworthy.  For each dimension, I subtracted ratings of 
blacks from ratings of whites and averaged the difference scores.  The cronbach’s alpha for the 
scale on each wave is .90 or higher.
7
  Racial Stereotypes, assessed in this way, has long been 
employed as a measure of prejudice, one that consistently predicts opposition to racial policies 
and black candidates, including Obama (e.g., Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Hutchings, 2009; Kinder & 
Kam, 2009; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Levine, Carmines, & Sniderman, 1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, 
& Sniderman, 1997; Piston, 2010). The pearson’s correlations between Racial Stereotypes and 
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism are modest: .20 (wave 3), .30 (wave 5), .29 (wave 6), .27 (wave 
7), and .23 (wave 8).  The same is true of the correlations between Racial Stereotypes and 
                                                 
6
 The pearson’s correlations in waves 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are: -.004 (p >. 10, N = 15,435), .03 (p < .001, N = 
14,889), .06 (p < .01, N = 3,177), .08 (p < .01, N = 1,743), and .05 (p < .10, N = 1,659).    
7
 Cronbach’s alphas for waves 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are .91, .90, .92, .91, and .93. 
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Attitudes about Racial Favoritism: .21 (wave 3), .21 (wave 5), .28 (wave 6), .26 (wave 7), and 
.23 (wave 8).   
In addition to measures of racial attitudes, the following analyses also include the 
standard predictors of candidate support, including economic perceptions, party identification, 
political ideology, education, age, income, gender, and residence in the South.  Details of each 
variable are included in Appendix A.  Each variable was coded to range from 0 to 1.  
The outcome in this study is support for Barack Obama.  I operationalize this concept in 
two ways, first with a measure of Obama Favorability, assessed with the standard 0-to-100 
feeling thermometer, where larger values indicate more positive feelings toward Obama.  The 
second measure is Vote Choice, where 1 indicates support for Obama and 0 indicates support for 
his Republican opponent (John McCain in 2008, Mitt Romney in 2012) (see Appendix A for full 
question wording).  Prior to each election, respondents were asked who they would vote for “if 
the presidential election were held today.”  After each election, respondents were first asked 
whether they voted and, if they answered yes, for whom they voted.    
 
Results 
To explain white opposition to black political leadership, and Obama in particular, prior 
research has focused almost exclusively on one potential explanation: racial prejudice.  Here I 
provide the first direct test of an alternative theory that whites expect black leaders to favor 
blacks at the expense of whites.  The first set of models is shown in Table 2, with each column 
representing a separate OLS regression for each wave predicting Obama Favorability.  As shown 
in Table 2, support for Obama was driven by many of the same factors found in prior research: 
racial stereotypes, economic perceptions, political predispositions, and demographics 
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(Hutchings, 2009; Piston, 2010).  But even in the presence these variables, both Perceptions of 
Racial Favoritism and Attitudes about Racial Favoritism had significant negative effects on 
Obama Favorability in all five waves.  Moreover, the effects are substantively large.  The 
difference between whites who perceived a lot of favoritism and those who perceived little 
favoritism ranged from 14 to 25 points on the 99-point feeling thermometer.  And the difference 
between whites who held very negative attitudes about favoritism and those who held very 
positive attitudes about favoritism ranged from 11 to 16 points.  To further clarify the magnitude 
of the effects, Figure 1 shows the impact of the favoritism variables during the critical 2008 and 
2012 election periods (waves 5 and 8), holding all other variables at their means.    
[Table 2 about Here] 
[Figure 1 about Here] 
In a past study (Baek & Landau, 2011), Perceptions and Attitudes about Racial 
Favoritism were combined into a single measure using a multiplicative function.  But is there, in 
fact, a significant interaction between these variables?  As shown in Table D1 in Appendix D, I 
only find a significant interaction in one of five tests (wave 5: -9.79, SE=2.91), in a wave with an 
unusually large sample size (N=13,860).  The interaction added only a trivial amount of 
explanatory power to the model (R-squared change=.0004).
8
 
Fear of racial favoritism reduced favorability toward Obama, but the more politically 
relevant question is whether this translated into a reduced likelihood of voting for him.  As 
shown in Table 3, which includes logistic regression models predicting Vote Choice for each 
wave, it did.  Despite the much reduced variance of the dichotomous vote choice measure 
compared to the 99-point feeling thermometer, on all four waves Perceptions of Racial 
                                                 
8
 The results are extremely similar if I model Obama favorability across all five panel waves 
simultaneously using linear multilevel regression models with individual random effects (see Table D2 in 
Appendix D).   
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Favoritism had a negative and significant impact on self-reported preference for Obama over his 
Republican opponent.  Attitudes about Racial Favoritism had significant effects on white vote 
choice in waves 3 and 5 during the 2008 campaign, but not in waves 7 and 8 during the 2012 
campaign.   
[Table 3 about Here] 
To ease interpretation of these results, I calculated the predicted probability of expressing 
an Obama vote preference at different levels of the racial favoritism variables, while holding all 
other variables at their means.  Perceptions of Racial Favoritism had a sizeable impact on all 
four waves: on wave 3, the probability of an Obama vote ranged from 21% among those who 
perceived a lot of favoritism to 55% among those who perceived little favoritism; for wave 5, the 
probabilities ranged from 19% to 74%; for wave 7, 13% to 60%; and for wave 8, 19% to 57%.  
The impact of Attitudes about Racial Favoritism, on the other hand, varied between the 2008 and 
2012 elections: on wave 3, the probability of an Obama vote ranged from 29% among those held 
very negative attitudes about favoritism to 65% among those who held very positive attitudes 
about favoritism; for wave 5, the probabilities ranged from 36% to 69%; for wave 7, 34% to 
30%; and for wave 8, 35% to 39%.  Because waves 5 and 8 capture whites’ ultimate vote choice 
in each election, Figure 2 presents graphs of the full range of probabilities in those waves.    
[Figure 2 about Here] 
 As in the prior analysis of Obama feeling thermometer ratings, I also assessed the 
interaction between Perceptions and Attitudes about Racial favoritism.  As shown in Table D3 in 
Appendix D, I again only found a significant interaction on wave 5, and surprisingly the 
interaction coefficient was positive (2.01, SE=.63).  But as in the last analysis, the interaction 
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added little explanatory power to the model, increasing the pseudo-R
2
 by only .0005; it is only 
significant due the unusually large sample size in wave 5 (N=12,062).
9
   
Taken together, the analyses presented thus far strongly suggest that white fear of racial 
favoritism played an important role in driving opposition to Obama throughout his campaigns 
and first term in office.  The findings show consistently large differences in Obama support 
between whites who fear racial favoritism and whites who do not.  With panel data, we can now 
take this logic a step further by examining whether these racial fears help to explain why whites 
changed in their support over time.  After the 2008 election, Obama’s support declined 
substantially during his first term.  Between wave 5, fielded immediately after the 2008 election, 
and wave 7, fielded immediately before the 2012 election, whites’ average ratings of Obama 
dropped from 51.32 to 42.26.   
Only with panel data is it possible to examine individual-level change.  But importantly, 
panel data alone are not enough; they require special statistical techniques, such as fixed effects 
regression (Allison, 1990, 2009; Halaby, 2004).  Fixed effects models are unique in that they use 
only within-person variance over time.  By contrast, other observational designs, including other 
panel designs, use between-person variance, and as a result spuriousness remains a major 
concern.  This is because between-person analyses rely on the dubious assumption that one has 
controlled for all individual differences.  With fixed effects, however, individuals are compared 
to themselves at an earlier point in time, so the main effects of all stable factors—such as 
education, income, age, gender, and political predispositions—drop out of the models, as do all 
other variables (whether observable or unobservable) that are constant over time.  Because each 
person is his or her own control, only variables that change over time within-persons can produce 
                                                 
9
 Table D4 in Appendix D shows the same pattern of results using multilevel logistic regression models 
with respondent random effects. 
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spurious associations.  And by including a dummy variable for survey wave I can efficiently 
capture the average total effects of all other time-varying influences (Halaby, 2004). 
In Table 4, I use a linear fixed effects regression model to examine the impact of within-
person change in perceptions and attitudes about racial favoritism on within-person change in 
Obama Favorability from wave 5 to wave 7.  Note that only variables that change over time can 
be included in the models; stable characteristics like gender automatically drop out and cannot 
influence the results.  Further, the Wave variable (0=wave 5, 1=wave 8) captures the average 
total change of all other time-varying influences, such as factors that change uniformly like age.  
To capture differential changes, I include indicators of within-person change in racial 
stereotypes, economic perceptions, party identification, ideology, education, and income.   
As hypothesized, the fixed effects model in Table 4 shows a significant negative impact 
of within-person change in Perceptions of Racial Favoritism on within-person change in whites’ 
feeling thermometer ratings of Obama.  In other words, the same exact individuals who increased 
over time in their perceptions of racial favoritism also became more negative in their feelings 
toward Obama.  Whites who became more negative in their Attitudes about Racial Favoritism or 
more likely to engage in racial stereotyping also exhibited declines in Obama support, though 
neither effect was significant.  (In results not shown, I find that the interaction between change in 
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism and change in Attitudes about Racial Favoritism is not 
significant (-.99, SE=7.11)). Of the non-racial predictors, only two showed significant effects.  
Whites who increasingly viewed the national economy in negative terms became more likely to 
evaluate Obama negatively, and whites who increasingly self-identified as Republicans also 
showed substantial declines in Obama Favorability.   
[Table 4 about Here] 
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The analysis in Table 4 examines the impact of change in various predictors on change in 
support for Obama.  But an alternative approach is to model the time-varying impact of initial 
levels of the predictors (Allison, 2009).  Methodologically, analyses of change on change may 
provide more conservative and/or unreliable estimates of effect size (Allison, 2009).  And 
theoretically, whites’ increasingly negative views about Obama may have been influenced not 
only by over-time changes in their racial attitudes, but also by the changing impact of their stable 
components.  That is, whites with more negative racial attitudes initially may have been more 
likely to decline in their support for Obama during this time period.      
Although in fixed effects models the constant effects of stable characteristics 
automatically drop out, one can model their time-varying effects by including interactions 
between each characteristic and Wave (Allison, 2009).  Using this method, I examine the time-
varying impact of 2008 levels of the predictors on within-person change in feelings toward 
Obama from wave 5 to wave 7.  I also control for the time-varying impact of initial levels of the 
dependent variable, in light of its association with the initial values of the predictors (see Table 2, 
Column 2).  Note that I only model the interactions between each stable characteristic and Wave 
because the main effects of stable characteristics automatically drop out with fixed effects.   
As shown in Table 5, 2008 levels of Perceptions of Racial Favoritism and Attitudes 
about Racial Favoritism significantly predicted declines over time in Obama Favorability from 
2008 to 2012.  (Again, I found no evidence of an interaction.
10
) Initial levels of Racial 
Stereotypes also had a negative effect on over-time change in Obama Favorability, though the 
effect was not significant.  In addition, whites who identified as more Republican or conservative 
in 2008 became more negative in their assessments of Obama during his first term.  By contrast, 
                                                 
10
 The three-way interaction between Wave, Perceptions of Racial Favoritism, and Attitudes about Racial 
Favoritism was not significant (9.55, SE=8.36). 
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initial economic perceptions had no effect, consistent with voters paying more attention to 
change in, rather than levels of, economic output.  Most importantly, the findings in Table 5 
provide even more support for a causal impact of fear of racial favoritism.  The results are 
especially powerful because they undercut the alternative explanation of reverse causality given 
that change in support for Obama could not have influenced prior levels of racial attitudes.
11
   
[Table 5 about Here] 
 
CCES 2014 Replication Controlling for Racial Resentment 
 In all of the preceding analyses, fear of racial favoritism influenced support for Obama 
even after controlling for racial stereotypes.  Nonetheless, the measurement of racial prejudice 
remains a matter of scholarly debate (for a review, see Huddy & Feldman, 2009).  So, to assess 
the robustness of my findings, I present an analysis of a separate survey executed after the 2014 
election that included another widely-used indicator, racial resentment.  The data come from the 
2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).  The CCES was fielded over the 
Internet by YouGov, which uses matched random sampling methodology (for more information 
and evidence of validity, see Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013).  The 2014 CCES included pre-
election and post-election waves.  This analysis uses the 1,590 non-Hispanic whites who were 
asked the resentment, favoritism, and Obama feeling thermometer items on the post-election 
wave fielded between November 5 and December 6, 2014.   
The CCES included the same Obama feeling thermometer as the 2008-2013 panel, as 
well as three of the items tapping perceptions of racial favoritism (Cronbach’s alpha = .94), and 
the one item assessing attitudes about racial favoritism.  Respondents were also asked three 
                                                 
11
 For an additional test, I also replicated the cross-sectional models predicting Obama favorability in 
Table 2 using lagged measures of the independent variables.  As shown in Table D5 in Appendix D, the 
effects of perceptions and attitudes about racial favoritism remained large and statistically significant.    
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standard racial resentment questions, which were combined to form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .84) (Tarman & Sears, 2005).  For control variables, additional items assessed economic 
perceptions, party identification, ideology, and standard demographics.  Full wording of all of 
these items are provided in Appendix C.  As in the prior analyses, Obama Favorability ranges 
from 0 to 100 and all of the independent variables range from 0 to 1.  
 Table 6 presents the results of an OLS regression predicting Obama Favorability in fall 
2014 from the CCES data.  As expected, Racial Resentment is strongly and negatively related to 
support for Obama.  Negative perceptions of the economy, Republican Party identification, and 
conservative ideology also had sizable negative effects on Obama Favorability.  But even after 
taking all of those factors into account, both Perceptions of Racial Favoritism and Attitudes 
about Racial Favoritism still had strong negative effects on Obama Favorability. (In analyses 
not shown, I find that the interaction between Perceptions of Racial Favoritism and Attitudes 
about Racial Favoritism was not significant (-9.97, SE=6.65)).  These results, using a separate 
survey and a different measure of racial prejudice, further demonstrate the robustness of the 
effects of white fear of racial favoritism.  Moreover, the size of the effects is strikingly similar to 
the previous analyses.  Whether controlling for racial resentment or racial stereotypes, fear of 
racial favoritism had a substantial negative impact on whites’ support for Obama.  
[Table 6 about Here] 
 
DISCUSSION 
Explaining white opposition to black political leadership is a central question in political 
science, and the overwhelming focus to-date has been on racial prejudice.  However, observers 
of political campaigns have long noticed the biased assumptions made about black candidates.  
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Why do blacks running for office have to go out of their way to prove that they will represent the 
interests of all, rather than blacks alone?  The answer, this study suggests, is fear of racial 
favoritism, a concept previously hypothesized to exist but never systematically measured until 
recently.  Using a new measure, my findings show that a majority of whites do indeed fear that 
black elected officials will engage in racial favoritism, aiding blacks at the expense of whites.   
Moreover, fear of racial favoritism had substantial effects on white political behavior.  
With panel data and a separate survey collectively covering a seven-year timespan, I find 
consistent evidence that such fears reduced support for Obama – whether using a standard 0-to-
100 feeling thermometer or a dichotomous measure of vote choice.  Further, these beliefs not 
only influenced support for Obama in traditional cross-sectional models, but also in particularly 
challenging tests using fixed effects models of within-person change.  Finally and perhaps most 
importantly, these effects held when controlling for racial stereotypes or racial resentment, two 
of the most widely-used indicators of racial prejudice.   In sum, the conclusion from these many 
analyses is clear: white fear of racial favoritism matters.  
 The significant impact of fear of racial favoritism contributes to ongoing efforts to 
understand white opposition to black political leadership.  With rare exception, political 
scientists have primarily focused on racial prejudice to the neglect of perceptions of group 
competition.  Biracial election contests represent an clear context in which whites may feel 
threatened by black political power, yet prior evidence has been indirect and open to alternative 
explanations.  The present study provides the strongest evidence yet that perceived threats to 
group interests help to explain why whites vote against black candidates.   
The existence of widespread fear of racial favoritism also furthers understanding of so-
called “deracialized” campaigning (e.g., Gillespie, 2010).  Obama, for instance, rarely talked 
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about race explicitly, even after repeated racist attacks on his campaign offices during the 2008 
campaign (Goldman & Mutz, 2014).  That whites expect black political leaders to favor blacks 
over whites makes for a troubling double-standard: either promote policies explicitly aimed at 
aiding blacks and reinforce racial fears, or limit those efforts to purportedly non-racial policies 
and make more limited strides (Hajnal, 2007).  For better or worse, Obama, along with the new 
wave of black politicians, have chosen the latter strategy, and many scholars suggest that this in 
part explains their recent successes among white voters (Gillespie, 2010).  At the same time, the 
strong negative impact of fear of racial favoritism on support for Obama points to the limits of 
the deracialization strategy, perhaps owing to the chronic accessibility of race among many 
whites (Tesler & Sears, 2010).   
 These same troubling dynamics may also affect election contests involving other 
stigmatized social groups, such as Latinos, women, and LGBT Americans.  For example, prior 
research provides many anecdotes of gay candidates putting forth incredible effort to minimize 
the salience of their sexuality and assuage voters that they are not single-issue candidates 
(Haider-Markel, 2010).  In light of Hillary Clinton’s failed presidential bid in 2008 and her entry 
into the 2016 race, the question of whether men fear gender favoritism is particularly timely, 
especially given evidence suggesting that traditional gender stereotypes have limited effects on 
support for female candidates (Brooks, 2013; Dolan, 2014; Kinder & Dale-Riddle, 2012).  Left 
unknown is whether Americans fear group favoritism from other minority candidates to the same 
degree as whites fear racial favoritism from black candidates.   
Future research is clearly needed to more fully understand the depth and breadth of fear 
of group favoritism, including the origins of these beliefs.  Why do some whites see black 
elected officials through the prism of group competition, while others do not?  On the one hand, 
21 
 
some people are likely predisposed to see others as a threat to their group’s dominance in the 
social order (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle 1994).  But, perhaps more importantly, 
situational conditions may provoke or lessen group threat reactions (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, 
and Hodson 2005).  The voluminous literature on “racial threat,” for instance, suggests that 
whites who live in the vicinity of larger black populations may be more likely to view black 
political leaders as threatening to their group’s interests (Enos 2015).  Yet as Allport (1954) 
emphasized more than half a century ago, even objectively small minority groups are often 
perceived as highly threatening to the dominant group’s interests, especially during periods of 
social change.  Indeed, recent years of have included substantial economic instability that may 
have heightened a sense of group competition.  Of course, the most salient change to have 
occurred is the election (and re-election) of Barack Obama, and this may have stoked racial 
fears, at least initially (Hardy, 2012).  The next question, then, is whether sustained exposure to 
Obama has stoked or alleviated whites’ fears about black political leadership.  
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Figure 1. The Impact of Fear of Racial Favoritism on Obama Favorability during the 2008 and 
2012 Elections  
 
1a) During the 2008 Election (wave 5: Fall 2008/Winter 2009): 
 
 
 
1b) During the 2012 Election (wave 8: Fall 2012/Winter 2013): 
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Figure 2. The Impact of Fear of Racial Favoritism on Obama Vote Choice during the 2008 and 
2012 Elections  
 
2a) During the 2008 Election (wave 5: Fall 2008/Winter 2009): 
 
 
 
2a) During the 2012 Election (wave 8: Fall 2012/Winter 2013): 
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Table 1. White Americans’ Perceptions and Attitudes about Racial Favoritism 
  
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism 
    Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the  
    following statements.  Black elected officials are more likely to. . . 
 
1. Favor blacks for government jobs over white applicants.   
    Strongly agree 16.0% 
    Somewhat agree 38.5% 
    Somewhat disagree 30.7% 
    Strongly disagree   
 
14.8% 
2. Support government spending that favors blacks.   
    Strongly agree 18.1% 
    Somewhat agree 42.4% 
    Somewhat disagree 26.0% 
    Strongly disagree 
 
13.5% 
3. Support policies that could cost whites jobs.   
    Strongly agree 9.5% 
    Somewhat agree 26.7% 
    Somewhat disagree 43.0% 
    Strongly disagree 
 
20.8% 
4. Give special favors to the black community.   
    Strongly agree 16.0% 
    Somewhat agree 37.7% 
    Somewhat disagree 29.2% 
    Strongly disagree 17.1% 
 
Attitudes about Racial Favoritism 
    Thinking about the statements you just read, would it be good or bad  
    if black elected officials favored blacks?  
    Very good 1.4% 
    Somewhat good 17.7% 
    Somewhat bad 48.3% 
    Very bad 32.6% 
 
Note: Includes non-Hispanic whites from wave 8 (N = 1,627). Excludes those who declined to answer—
about 4% of the sample.  
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Table 2. OLS Regression Models Predicting Obama Favorability from 2008 to 2013  
 
 Wave 3 
Summer 
2008 
Wave 5 
Fall 2008/ 
Winter 2009 
Wave 6 
Fall 2010 
Wave 7 
Fall 2012 
Wave 8 
Fall 2012/ 
Winter 2013 
Perceptions of Racial 
Favoritism 
 
 -14.18*** 
(1.41) 
-24.71*** 
(.80) 
-15.04*** 
(1.37) 
-14.62*** 
(1.81) 
-17.63*** 
(1.83) 
Attitudes about Racial 
Favoritism 
 
-15.67*** 
(1.71) 
-15.08*** 
(.79) 
-14.51*** 
(1.45) 
 
-3.78 
(2.03) 
-10.64*** 
(2.08) 
Racial Stereotypes  -30.69*** 
(4.58) 
 
-19.97*** 
(2.55) 
-11.23** 
(4.30) 
-13.40* 
(5.72) 
-15.28* 
(5.92) 
Perceptions of Family 
Finances (worse) 
 
-1.06 
(1.69) 
3.25*** 
(.76) 
-2.08 
(1.43) 
-1.80 
(2.14) 
-7.37** 
(2.28) 
Perceptions of National 
Economy (worse) 
 
14.92*** 
(2.38) 
11.53*** 
(1.36) 
-23.09*** 
(1.27) 
-34.90*** 
(2.08) 
-28.61*** 
(2.04) 
Party ID (Republican) - 30.53*** 
(1.48) 
-32.59*** 
(.69) 
-32.89*** 
(1.31) 
-39.02*** 
(1.89) 
-41.24*** 
(1.99) 
Ideology (Conservative) -31.20*** 
(2.12) 
-25.78*** 
(1.00) 
-29.10*** 
(1.86) 
-19.36*** 
(2.57) 
-17.22*** 
(2.79) 
Education   28.20*** 
(3.72) 
8.21*** 
(1.66) 
4.52 
(2.98) 
-4.19 
(4.80) 
-3.56 
(5.09) 
Income 4.69* 
(1.91) 
5.52*** 
(.89) 
-.89 
(1.57) 
4.12 
(2.49) 
.62 
(2.64) 
Age  3.00 
(2.96) 
9.57*** 
(1.33) 
4.62* 
(2.05) 
1.10 
(3.23) 
6.75* 
(3.39) 
Gender (female) .52 
(.80) 
.91* 
(.36) 
1.93** 
(.66) 
1.82* 
(.91) 
2.37* 
(.96) 
South -4.23*** 
(.85) 
-1.66*** 
(.40) 
-1.03 
(.71) 
.01 
(1.02) 
-1.00 
(1.07) 
Constant 12.86** 
(4.84) 
34.07*** 
(2.44) 
46.22*** 
(4.01) 
54.70*** 
(6.19) 
62.58*** 
(6.72) 
Sample Size 3,524 13,860 3,110 1,685 1,606 
Adj. R
2
 .49 .55 .66 .70 .68 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses.  Favorability ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more positive feelings 
toward Obama.  All of the independent variables range from 0 to 1. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Vote Choice from 2008 to 2013  
 
 Wave 3 
Summer 
2008 
Wave 5 
Fall 2008/ 
Winter 2009 
Wave 7 
Fall 
2012 
Wave 8 
Fall 2012/ 
Winter 2013 
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism 
 
-1.53*** 
(.23) 
-2.50*** 
(.15) 
-2.36*** 
(.49) 
-1.72*** 
(.47) 
Attitudes about Racial Favoritism  
 
-1.48*** 
(.28) 
-1.41*** 
(.15) 
.18 
(.55) 
-.20 
(.49) 
Racial Stereotypes  -1.95* 
(.81) 
-2.65*** 
(.52) 
-.78 
(1.47) 
-2.99 
(1.64) 
Perceptions of Family Finances 
(worse) 
.86** 
(.27) 
.76*** 
(.14) 
-.05 
(.58) 
-1.03 
(.56) 
Perceptions of National Economy 
(worse) 
1.75*** 
(.42) 
1.76*** 
(.26) 
-5.15*** 
(.54) 
-3.40*** 
(.48) 
Party ID (Republican) -4.74*** 
(.23) 
-5.13*** 
(.12) 
-6.00*** 
(.46) 
-6.04*** 
(.47) 
Ideology (Conservative) -4.03*** 
(.35) 
-3.95*** 
(.19) 
-3.68*** 
(.68) 
-3.69*** 
(.68) 
Education  2.23*** 
(.60) 
1.94*** 
(.32) 
-.75 
(1.34) 
.13 
(1.36) 
Income .50 
(.31) 
.18 
(.17) 
-.23 
(.68) 
.24 
(.66) 
Age -.59 
(.48) 
-.40 
(.26) 
-.78 
(.88) 
.44 
(.87) 
Gender (female) -.09 
(.13) 
-.27*** 
(.07) 
-.27 
(.25) 
-.29 
(.24) 
South -.72*** 
(.14) 
-.40*** 
(.08) 
-.16 
(.28) 
-.36 
(.28) 
Constant -5.47*** 
(.81) 
-4.68*** 
(.48) 
.94 
(1.65) 
-.02 
(1.73) 
Sample Size 3,014 12,062 1,458 1,287 
Nagelkerke R
2
 .73 .77 .86 .84 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  Vote 
choice ranges from 0 to1, where 1 equals support for Obama and 0 equals support for his Republican 
opponent.  All of the independent variables range from 0 to 1.  ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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Table 4. Effects of Within-Person Change in Fear of Racial Favoritism on Within-Person 
Change in Obama Favorability from 2008 to 2012 (Fixed Effects Panel Analysis) 
 
  
Change in Perceptions of Racial Favoritism  
 
-12.52*** 
(2.08) 
Change in Attitudes about Racial Favoritism 
 
-4.04 
(2.20) 
Change in Racial Stereotypes 
  
-2.74 
(7.44) 
Change in Perceptions of Family Finances (worse) 
 
-2.41 
(1.97) 
Change in Perceptions of the National Economy (worse) 
 
-11.21*** 
(1.85) 
Change in Party ID (Republican) 
  
-22.81*** 
(3.11) 
Change in Ideology (Conservative) 
  
-6.88 
(3.83) 
Change in Education 
 
5.36 
(10.82) 
Change in Income 
 
6.40 
(3.68) 
Wave   
 
-13.55*** 
(.80) 
Constant 54.71*** 
(9.23) 
Sample Size 1,646 
Within-Person R
2
 .23 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized fixed effects regression coefficients and standard errors.  The model 
predicts within-person change in Obama Favorability from wave 5 to 7.  Favorability ranges from 0 to 
100, with higher values indicating more positive feelings toward Obama.  All independent variables range 
from 0 to 1.  ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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Table 5. Effects of Initial Levels of Fear of Racial Favoritism on Within-Person Change in 
Obama Favorability from 2008 to 2012 (Fixed Effects Panel Analysis) 
 
  
2008 Perceptions of Racial Favoritism X Wave  
 
-9.73*** 
(2.38) 
2008 Attitudes about Racial Favoritism X Wave 
 
-5.66* 
(2.30) 
2008 Racial Stereotypes X Wave 
 
-3.34 
(6.78) 
2008 Perceptions of Family Finances (worse) X Wave 
 
-.83 
(2.18) 
2008 Perceptions of National Economy (worse) X Wave 
 
3.04 
(3.68) 
2008 Party ID (Republican) X Wave 
  
-26.23*** 
(2.05) 
2008 Ideology (Conservative) X Wave 
  
-13.75*** 
(2.83) 
2008 Education X Wave 
  
9.49 
(5.54) 
2008 Income X Wave 
  
1.08 
(3.08) 
2008 Age X Wave 
  
-10.95** 
(4.13) 
2008 Gender (female) X Wave 
  
1.13 
(1.03) 
2008 South X Waves  
  
-1.62 
(1.14) 
2008 Obama Favorability X Wave 
 
-.54*** 
(.02) 
Wave 
  
6.41 
(7.42) 
Constant 
 
51.42*** 
(.36) 
Sample Size 1,584 
Within-Person R
2
 .37 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized fixed effects regression coefficients and standard errors.  The model 
predicts within-person change in Obama Favorability from wave 5 to 7. Favorability ranges from 0 to 
100, with higher values indicating more positive feelings toward Obama.  All independent variables range 
from 0 to 1.  ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, #p<.10 
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Table 6. CCES 2014: The Impact of Fear of Racial Favoritism on Obama Favorability, 
Controlling for Racial Resentment (OLS) 
 
  
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism  
 
-12.38*** 
(2.16) 
Attitudes about Racial Favoritism 
 
-7.94** 
(2.33) 
Racial Resentment 
  
-17.54*** 
(2.78) 
Perceptions of Family Finances (worse) 
 
.53 
(2.41) 
Perceptions of National Economy (worse) 
 
-37.73*** 
(2.73) 
Party ID (Republican) 
  
-38.62*** 
(2.13) 
Ideology (Conservative) 
  
-11.72*** 
(2.70) 
Education 
 
-3.95 
(2.02) 
Income 
 
-6.78 
(5.42) 
Age 
 
-2.27 
(2.75) 
Gender (female) 
 
3.62** 
(1.13) 
South 
 
-1.93 
(1.17) 
Constant 109.66*** 
(2.85) 
Sample Size 1,318 
Adj. R
2
 .68 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses.  Favorability ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more positive feelings 
toward Obama.  All independent variables range from 0 to 1. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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Online Appendix A: Wording of the 2008-2013 Panel Survey Items 
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism. On waves 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, respondents were asked 
to: “Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.  
Black elected officials are more likely to. . . Favor blacks for government jobs over white 
applicants.  Support government spending that favors blacks.  Support policies that could cost 
whites jobs.  Give special favors to the black community.” (strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, strongly disagree).  I combined the four perception items into a reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s alphas for waves 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are .94, .92, .93, .94, and .94), and coded it to 
range from zero to one.  
Attitudes about Racial Favoritism. On waves 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, immediately following the 
perceptions of racial favoritism questions respondent were asked, “Thinking about the statements 
you just read, would it be good or bad if black elected officials favored blacks?” (very good, 
somewhat good, somewhat bad, very bad).  The measure was coded to range from zero to one, 
where higher scores indicating having a more negative attitude about favoritism.  
Racial Stereotypes. Starting on the latter part of wave 3, and continuing through waves 4, 
5, 6, 7, and 8, whites rated whites and blacks on three scales, ranging from hardworking to lazy, 
intelligent to unintelligent, and trustworthy to untrustworthy.  For each dimension, respondent’s 
ratings of blacks were subtracted from ratings of whites, and then these difference scores were 
averaged to create a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alphas for waves 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are .91 (N = 
3,831), .90 (N = 15,232), .92 (N = 3,263), .91 (N = 1,826), and .93 (N = 1,738)).  This process 
initially produced values ranging from  -100 to 100, where negative values indicate having more 
positive attitudes toward blacks than whites and positive values indicate having more positive 
attitudes toward whites than blacks.  I then recoded the measure to range from zero to one.  
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 "Next are some questions about various groups in our society. Below are left-right scales 
on which you can rate characteristics of people in different groups. For the first item below, the 
far left side of the scale means that you think most of the people in that group are extremely 
“hard working.” Placing the slider on the far right side means that you think most of the people 
in that group are extremely “lazy.” The middle means that you think the people in this group are 
not particularly towards one end or the other." As practice, respondents were first asked, "Where 
would you rate physicians in general on this scale?" Immediately after, respondents were asked 
to rate either Whites or Blacks, and later in the survey asked about the other group (with the 
order randomized). "Where would you rate Whites in general on these scales?" "Where would 
you rate Blacks in general on these scales?" Below is an example of one the scales.  
 
Hard working  Lazy 
 
 
Obama Favorabilty. On all eight waves, respondents were asked to rate Barack Obama 
on a standard feeling 0-to-100 thermometer: “Please rate Barack Obama on a thermometer that 
runs from 0 to 100 degrees.  Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward 
him, and rating below 50 means that feel unfavorable and cool.”  Respondents were also given 
two other options: “Don’t know who person is” and “Don’t know enough about him.”  Those 
who checked either of the latter two boxes were excluded from the analyses.   
Obama Vote Choice: Prior to the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, respondents were 
asked who they would vote for “if the presidential election were held today.”  After each 
election, respondents were first asked if they voted, and then if so, for whom they chose to vote.  
The latter part of wave 2, wave 3, wave 4, and wave 7 included the vote intention question; 
40 
 
waves 5 and 8 included the self-reported vote question.  The 2008 vote intention question was as 
follows (with the order of the Democratic and Republican candidates randomized): “If the 
presidential election were held today and John McCain and Sarah Palin, the Republicans, were 
running against Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the Democrats, who would you vote for?”  The 
question was then followed by a list of candidates (also in randomized order): “John McCain and 
Sarah Palin, the Republicans; Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the Democrats; Ralph Nader and 
Matt Gonzalez, the Independents; Bob Barr and Wayne Allyn Root, the Libertarians, Cynthia 
McKinney and Rosa Clemente, the Green Party candidates; Other [specify]; Don’t know.”  The 
2008 vote choice question was as follows: “In the 2008 presidential election who did you vote 
for:” followed by a list of candidates (with the order randomized): “John McCain and Sarah 
Palin, the Republicans; Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the Democrats; Ralph Nader and Matt 
Gonzalez, the Independents; Bob Barr and Wayne Allyn Root, the Libertarians; Other, please 
specify.”  The 2012 vote intention question was as follows (with candidate order randomized): 
“If the presidential election were held today between Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, the 
Republicans, against Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the Democrats, who would you vote for?”  
The question was then followed by a list of candidates (with the order randomized): “Mitt 
Romney and Paul Ryan, the Republicans; Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the Democrats; Other 
[specify]; Don’t know.”  The 2012 vote choice question was as follows: “In the 2012 presidential 
election who did you vote for:” followed by a list of candidates (with the order randomized): 
“Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, the Republicans; Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the Democrats; 
Other, please specify.”  Responses to these items were coded so that one indicates support for 
Obama and zero indicates support for his Republican opponent (John McCain in 2008, Mitt 
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Romney in 2012).  Those who said they would/did support another candidate were excluded 
from the analyses.   
Economic Perceptions.  On waves 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, respondents were asked two 
questions about their economic perceptions.  One question assessed Perceptions of Family 
Finances: "We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you 
say that you and your family living here are better off, worse off, or just about the same 
financially as you were a year ago?" (a lot better off, a little better off, a little worse off, a lot 
worse off, just about the same).  Response were re-coded to range from zero to one (where 0=a 
lot better off, .25=a little better off, .5=just about the same, .75=a little worse off, and 1=a lot 
worse off).  A second question assessed Perceptions of the National Economy: "Thinking about 
the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the nation's 
economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?" (gotten a lot better, gotten a 
little better, gotten a little worse, gotten a lot worse, stayed about the same).  Responses to this 
question were also re-coded to range from zero to one (where 0=gotten a lot better, .25=gotten a 
little better, .5=stayed about the same, .75=gotten a little worse, and 1=gotten a lot worse).  
Party Identification.  On the GfK profile survey and waves 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, party 
identification was measured using the standard set of branching questions, which produced a 
seven-point scale (where 0=strong Republican, .17= weak Republican, .33=leaning Republican, 
.50=Independent/undecided/other, .67=leaning Democrat, .83=weak Democrat, and 1=strong 
Democrat).   
Ideology.  On the GfK profile survey and waves 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, ideology was 
measured using the standard question: “In general, do you think of yourself as . . . “ (Extremely 
liberal, Liberal, Slightly liberal, Moderate, middle of the road, Slightly conservative, 
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Conservative, Extremely Conservative).  Responses were re-coded to range from zero to one 
(where 0=extremely conservative, .17=conservative, .33=slightly conservative, .50=moderate, 
.67=slightly liberal, and .83=liberal, and 1=extremely liberal).  
Education. On the GfK profile survey prior to wave 1 and then again between waves 6 
and 7, respondents were asked for the highest grade/degree that they received.  These responses 
were then converted into an indicator of the number of years of education received (with an 
original range of 2.50 – 20), and then re-coded to range from zero to one.    
Gender. Measured on the GfK profile survey (0=male and 1=female). 
Region. Measured on the GfK profile survey (0=non-South and 1=South). 
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Online Appendix B: Demographics of the Panel Survey 
 
Table B1. Demographics of the July 2008 Current Population Survey and the 2008-2013 Panel 
Survey  
 
 2008 CPS Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 
Education          
High school or less 44.2% 31.0% 28.7% 26.6% 25.8% 25.4% 23.3% 41.3% 41.7% 
Some college 28.1% 34.8% 34.6% 34.9% 34.6% 34.4% 31.0% 23.4% 23.3% 
College graduate 18.2% 21.2% 22.5% 23.6% 24.0% 24.5% 26.3% 21.0% 20.8% 
Postgraduate work 9.5% 13.0% 14.2% 14.9% 15.6% 15.7% 19.4% 14.3% 14.2% 
          
Income          
Less than $25,000 19.7% 19.9% 18.9% 16.9% 16.2% 15.9% 13.0% 19.9% 19.9% 
$25-49,999 26.2% 32.6% 31.8% 29.7% 29.4% 29.5% 27.9% 26.4% 26.5% 
$50-74,999 20.6% 20.8% 20.7% 21.2% 21.2% 21.3% 22.7% 21.9% 21.7% 
$75-99,999 13.4% 13.0% 13.7% 14.9% 15.3% 15.4% 15.7% 15.3% 15.4% 
$100,000 or more 20.1% 13.7% 14.9% 17.2% 17.8% 18.0% 20.7% 16.5% 16.6% 
          
Age          
18-29 20.1% 10.1% 9.6% 9.9% 9.4% 9.1% 7.1% 5.5% 5.3% 
30-44 26.5% 27.5% 27.0% 26.8% 26.6% 26.0% 24.0% 34.3% 33.9% 
45-59 28.6% 34.7% 35.4% 36.4% 36.8% 37.1% 37.4% 27.4% 27.2% 
60+ 24.7% 27.6% 28.0% 26.9% 27.1% 27.9% 31.5% 32.8% 33.6% 
          
Gender          
Male 47.8% 46.1% 46.2% 43.8% 43.6% 43.9% 47.3% 47.0% 46.9% 
Female 52.2% 53.9% 53.8% 56.2% 56.4% 56.1% 52.7% 53.0% 53.1% 
          
Race          
White Non-Hispanic 73.1% 81.2% 80.9% 79.2% 80.1% 80.6% 100.0% 70.1% 70.3% 
Black Non-Hispanic 9.3% 8.5% 8.4% 9.5% 9.1% 8.8%  13.4% 13.1% 
Hispanic 10.9% 5.9% 5.8% 6.4% 6.0% 5.8%  9.8% 9.8% 
Other, Non-Hispanic 6.7% 4.3% 4.8% 4.9% 4.8% 4.8%  6.8% 6.8% 
          
Sample Size 101,618 19,190 17,747 20,052 19,241 19,234 3,263 2,606 2,471 
 
Note: Data are unweighted.   
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Online Appendix C: Wording of the 2014 CCES Items 
Racial Resentment. Respondents were asked three questions, including two questions on 
the common content and one question on the team module.  The first two questions began with 
the stem: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?”  Then, respondents were 
shown two statements, each with five response options (strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither 
agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree): 1) “The Irish, Italians, Jews and 
many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up.  Blacks should do the same 
without any special favors.” 2) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created 
conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.”  The third 
item appeared on the team module: 3) “Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements.  It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if 
blacks would only try harder, they could be as well off as whites.”  The second item was reverse 
coded, and all three items were averaged to create a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .84).  
Finally, the scale was re-coded to range from zero to one.  
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism. “Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements.  Black elected officials are more likely to. . . Favor blacks 
for government jobs over white applicants.  Support government spending that favors blacks.  
Give special favors to the black community.” (strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat 
disagree, strongly disagree).  I combined the three perception items into a reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .94), and coded the measure to range from zero to one.  
Attitudes about Racial Favoritism. “Thinking about the statements you just read, would 
it be good or bad if black elected officials favored blacks?” (very good, somewhat good, 
somewhat bad, very bad). 
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Obama Favorabilty. “Please rate Barack Obama on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 
100 degrees.  Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward him, and rating 
below 50 means that feel unfavorable and cool.”  Respondents were also given two other 
options: “Don’t know who person is” and “Don’t know enough about him.”  Those who checked 
either of the latter two boxes were excluded from the analyses.   
Perceptions of Family Finances.  “Over the past four years has your household’s annual 
income…?” (0=increased a lot, .25=increased somewhat, .5=stayed about the same, 
.75=decreased somewhat, 1=decreased a lot).   
Perceptions of the National Economy. “Would you say that over the past year the 
nation’s economy has . . . ?” (0=gotten much better, .25=gotten better, .5=stayed about the same, 
.75=gotten worse, 1=gotten much worse).  
Party Identification.  Measured using the standard set of branching questions, which 
produced a seven-point scale (where 0=strong Republican, .17= weak Republican, .33=leaning 
Republican, .50=Independent/undecided/other, .67=leaning Democrat, .83=weak Democrat, and 
1=strong Democrat).   
Ideology.  Measured using the standard question, which produced a seven-point scale 
(where 0=extremely conservative, .17=conservative, .33=slightly conservative, .50=moderate, 
.67=slightly liberal, and .83=liberal, and 1=extremely liberal).  
Education. Measured the highest grade/degree received (0=no HS, .2=high school 
graduate, .4=some college, .6=2-year, .8=4-year, 1=post-grad).  
Gender. 0=male and 1=female. 
Region. 0=non-South and 1=South. 
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Online Appendix D: Additional Models 
Table D1. The Interaction of Perceptions and Attitudes about Racial Favoritism on Obama 
Favorability, 2008 – 2013 (OLS) 
 
 Wave 3 
Summer 
2008 
Wave 5 
Fall 2008/ 
Winter 2009 
Wave 6 
Fall 2010 
Wave 7 
Fall 2012 
Wave 8 
Fall 2012/ 
Winter 2013 
Perceptions of Racial 
Favoritism 
 
 -10.75*** 
(2.39) 
-22.03*** 
(1.13) 
-13.07*** 
(2.06) 
-12.96*** 
(2.74) 
-16.71*** 
(2.78) 
Attitudes about Racial 
Favoritism 
 
-11.12*** 
(3.09) 
-10.49*** 
(1.58) 
-11.01*** 
(3.09) 
-1.11 
(3.87) 
-9.20* 
(3.89) 
Perceptions X Attitudes 
 
-10.77 
(6.09) 
-9.79** 
(2.91) 
-6.78 
(5.28) 
-5.46 
(6.75) 
-3.00 
(6.84) 
Racial Stereotypes  -30.05*** 
(4.60) 
-19.15*** 
(2.56) 
-10.72* 
(4.32) 
-13.17* 
(5.73) 
-15.05* 
(5.94) 
Perceptions of Family 
Finances  
 
-1.11 
(1.69) 
3.21*** 
(.76) 
-2.15 
(1.44) 
-1.81 
(2.14) 
-7.33** 
(2.29) 
Perceptions of National 
Economy  
14.91*** 
(2.38) 
 
11.65*** 
(1.36) 
-23.05*** 
(1.27) 
-34.89*** 
(2.08) 
-28.63*** 
(2.05) 
Party ID (Democrat)  30.62*** 
(1.48) 
32.63*** 
(.69) 
32.90*** 
(1.31) 
39.08*** 
(1.90) 
41.22*** 
(1.99) 
Ideology (Liberal) 31.30*** 
(2.12) 
25.87*** 
(1.00) 
29.27*** 
(1.86) 
19.42*** 
(2.57) 
17.34*** 
(2.81) 
Education   28.36*** 
(3.72) 
8.38*** 
(1.66) 
4.78 
(2.98) 
-3.95 
(4.81) 
-3.42 
(5.10) 
Income 4.71* 
(1.91) 
5.47*** 
(.89) 
-.87 
(1.57) 
4.15 
(2.49) 
.63 
(2.64) 
Age  2.89 
(2.96) 
9.34*** 
(1.34) 
4.58* 
(2.05) 
1.11 
(3.23) 
6.74* 
(3.39) 
Gender (female) .56 
(.80) 
.94* 
(.36) 
1.96** 
(.66) 
1.83* 
(.91) 
2.40* 
(.96) 
South -4.22*** 
(.85) 
-1.66*** 
(.40) 
-1.04 
(.71) 
.01 
(1.02) 
-.97 
(1.07) 
Constant 3.01 
(4.89) 
24.69*** 
(2.47) 
37.42*** 
(4.16) 
51.68*** 
(6.25) 
56.52*** 
(6.83) 
Sample Size 3,524 13,860 3,110 1,685 1,606 
Adj. R
2
 .49 .55 .66 .70 .68 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses.  Favorability ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more positive feelings 
toward Obama.  All of the independent variables range from 0 to 1. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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Table D2. Effects of Fear of Racial Favoritism on Obama Favorability, 2008 – 2013 (Multilevel 
Linear Regression with Respondent Random Effects) 
 
    
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism 
 
-14.96***  
(.57) 
-16.61*** 
(.57) 
-12.34*** 
(1.77) 
Attitudes about Racial Favoritism 
 
 -12.85*** 
(.61) 
-10.32*** 
(1.17) 
Perceptions X Attitudes about  
Racial Favoritism 
 
  -5.38* 
(2.11) 
Racial Stereotypes  -32.56*** 
(1.92) 
-26.29*** 
(1.93) 
-25.98*** 
(1.93) 
Perceptions of Family Finances  -.39 
(.59) 
-.24 
(.59) 
-.26 
(.59) 
Perceptions of National Economy  4.13*** 
(.56) 
4.55*** 
(.56) 
4.57*** 
(.56) 
Party ID (Democrat) 36.03*** 
 (.59) 
35.08*** 
(.59) 
35.12*** 
(.59) 
Ideology (Liberal) 28.18*** 
(.83) 
26.67*** 
(.83) 
26.74*** 
(.83) 
Education  13.12***  
(1.56) 
10.60*** 
(1.55) 
10.72*** 
(1.55) 
Income 3.53*** 
(.82) 
3.70*** 
(.81) 
3.69*** 
(.81) 
Age -9.54*** 
 (1.10) 
-8.28*** 
(1.09) 
-8.35*** 
(1.09) 
Gender (female) .94** 
(.35) 
.87* 
(.34) 
.88* 
(.34) 
South -2.53*** 
(.38) 
-2.26*** 
(.37) 
-2.26*** 
(.37) 
Constant 35.47*** 
(1.90) 
43.53*** 
(1.92) 
41.25*** 
(2.12) 
Number of Observations 24,026 23,785 23,785 
Number of Respondents 15,212 15,090 15,090 
Overall R
2
 .53 .54 .54 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized coefficients from a multilevel linear regression model with respondent 
random effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Includes panel waves 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8.  Favorability 
ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more positive feelings toward Obama.  All of the 
independent variables range from 0 to 1. ***p<.001, *p<.05 
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Table D3. The Interaction of Perceptions and Attitudes about Racial Favoritism on Vote Choice, 
2008 – 2013 (Logit) 
 
 Wave 3 
Summer 
2008 
Wave 5 
Fall 2008/ 
Winter 2009 
Wave 7 
Fall 
2012 
Wave 8 
Fall 2012/ 
Winter 2013 
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism 
 
-1.24** 
(.40) 
-3.06*** 
(.23) 
-3.06*** 
(.83) 
-2.07** 
(.68) 
Attitudes about Racial Favoritism  
 
-1.09* 
(.51) 
-2.36*** 
(.34) 
-.91 
(1.16) 
-.83 
(1.01) 
Perceptions X Attitudes 
 
-.95 
(1.06) 
2.01** 
(.63) 
2.17 
(2.06) 
1.28 
(1.81) 
Racial Stereotypes  -1.90* 
(.82) 
-2.73*** 
(.52) 
-.77 
(1.47) 
-3.13 
(1.64) 
Perceptions of Family Finances .86** 
(.27) 
.76*** 
(.14) 
-.04 
(.58) 
-1.05 
(.56) 
Perceptions of National Economy  1.74*** 
(.42) 
1.75*** 
(.26) 
-5.15*** 
(.54) 
-3.40*** 
(.47) 
Party ID (Democrat) 4.75*** 
(.23) 
5.13*** 
(.12) 
5.99*** 
(.46) 
6.06*** 
(.47) 
Ideology (Liberal) 4.03*** 
(.35) 
3.94*** 
(.19) 
3.69*** 
(.68) 
3.65*** 
(.69) 
Education  2.25*** 
(.60) 
1.95*** 
(.32) 
-.76 
(1.34) 
.10 
(1.36) 
Income .49 
(.31) 
.19 
(.17) 
-.25 
(.68) 
.21 
(.66) 
Age -.58 
(.48) 
-.37 
(.26) 
-.79 
(.88) 
.43 
(.87) 
Gender (female) -.09 
(.13) 
-.27*** 
(.07) 
-.28 
(.25) 
-.31 
(.24) 
South -.72*** 
(.14) 
-.40*** 
(.08) 
-.15 
(.28) 
-.37 
(.28) 
Constant -5.65*** 
(.84) 
-4.36*** 
(.49) 
1.32 
(1.69) 
.29 
(1.79) 
Sample Size 3,014 12,062 1,458 1,287 
Nagelkerke R
2
 .73 .77 .86 .84 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  Vote 
choice ranges from 0 to1, where 1 equals support for Obama and 0 equals support for his Republican 
opponent.  All of the independent variables range from 0 to 1.  ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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Table D4. Effects of White Fear of Racial Favoritism on Vote Choice, 2008 – 2013 (Multilevel 
Logistic Regression with Respondent Random Effects) 
 
    
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism 
 
-3.35***  
(.23) 
-3.65*** 
(.24) 
-4.14*** 
(.34) 
Attitudes about Racial Favoritism 
 
 -2.15*** 
(.22) 
-2.95*** 
(.45) 
Perceptions X Attitudes about  
Racial Favoritism 
 
  1.75* 
(.83) 
Racial Stereotypes  -5.50*** 
(.72) 
-4.40*** 
(.72) 
-4.45*** 
(.71) 
Perceptions of Family Finances  .96*** 
(.21) 
1.04*** 
(.21) 
1.03*** 
(.21) 
Perceptions of National Economy  -.49* 
(.23) 
-.46* 
(.23) 
-.47* 
(.23) 
Party ID (Democrat) 9.63*** 
 (.40) 
9.45*** 
(.39) 
9.41*** 
(.39) 
Ideology (Liberal) 7.12*** 
(.37) 
6.84*** 
(.37) 
6.81*** 
(.36) 
Education   3.64*** 
(.50) 
3.27*** 
(.50) 
3.26*** 
(.50) 
Income .48 
(.25) 
.49 
(.26) 
.49 
(.25) 
Age -.55 
 (.36) 
-.35 
(.36) 
-.34 
(.36) 
Gender (female) -.37*** 
(.10) 
-.35** 
(.10) 
-.35** 
(.10) 
South -.86*** 
(.12) 
-.82*** 
(.12) 
-.81*** 
(.12) 
Constant -5.80*** 
(.68) 
-5.60*** 
(.68) 
-5.25*** 
(.69) 
Number of Observations 17,993 17,821 17,821 
Number of Respondents 13,455 13,344 13,344 
Log likelihood -4601.57 -4511.78 -4509.57 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized coefficients from a multilevel logistic regression model with respondent 
random effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Includes panel waves 3, 5, 7, and 8.  Vote choice 
ranges from 0 to1, where 1 equals support for Obama and 0 equals support for his Republican opponent.  
All of the independent variables range from 0 to 1.  ***p<.001, *p<.05 
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Table D5. The Impact of Lagged Predictors on Obama Favorability, 2008 – 2013 (OLS) 
 
 Wave 5 
Fall 2008/ 
Winter 2009 
Wave 6 
Fall 2010 
Wave 7 
Fall 2012 
Wave 8 
Fall 2012/ 
Winter 2013 
Perceptions of Racial Favoritism 
 
-10.63*** 
(1.52) 
-20.64*** 
(1.60) 
-23.24*** 
(2.48) 
-25.54*** 
(2.54) 
Attitudes about Racial Favoritism 
 
-14.14*** 
(1.83) 
-16.91*** 
(1.60) 
-13.23*** 
(2.51) 
-12.26*** 
(2.58) 
Racial Stereotypes  -31.64*** 
(5.06) 
-18.48*** 
(5.18) 
 -10.46 
(7.48) 
-19.35* 
(7.56) 
Perceptions of Family Finances  
 
4.65* 
(1.81) 
.70 
(1.50) 
.35 
(2.40) 
-.98 
(2.44) 
Perceptions of National Economy  16.11*** 
(2.56) 
7.10** 
(2.64) 
8.51* 
(4.08) 
8.19* 
(4.14) 
Party ID (Democrat) 29.50*** 
(1.62) 
35.04*** 
(1.38) 
40.95*** 
(2.08) 
39.95*** 
(2.13) 
Ideology (Liberal) 28.89*** 
(2.29) 
27.28*** 
(2.00) 
25.53*** 
(3.06) 
26.72*** 
(3.11) 
Education  14.49*** 
(3.99) 
13.78*** 
(3.28) 
13.75* 
(6.09) 
11.71 
(6.21) 
Income 4.31* 
(2.05) 
.35 
(1.71) 
5.59 
(3.38) 
6.21 
(3.45) 
Age 8.70** 
(3.21) 
2.53 
(2.77) 
-4.81 
(4.50) 
4.01 
(4.60) 
Gender (female) 2.18* 
(.85) 
.87 
(.72) 
1.92 
(1.13) 
2.00 
(1.16) 
South -3.02** 
(.92) 
-1.21 
(.78) 
-2.03 
(1.25) 
-2.35 
(1.28) 
Constant 26.47*** 
(5.33) 
25.74*** 
(5.00) 
19.83* 
(8.15) 
24.96** 
(8.26) 
Sample Size 2,686 3,079 1,645 1,581 
Adj. R
2
 .51 .60 .54 .54 
 
Note. Presents unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses.  Favorability ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more positive feelings 
toward Obama.  In column 1, Obama favorability on wave 5 is predicted by measures from wave 3.  
Columns 2, 3, and 4 predict Obama favorability on waves 6, 7, and 8, respectively; all use measures of the 
independent variables from wave 5.  ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
 
